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Abstract
We develop a conceptual framework which captures the e¤ect of the VAT system
on prot by two e¤ective taxes. This allows (i) predictions of the determinants of vol-
untary registration and bunching at the registration threshold; (ii) develops a formula
for estimating the elasticity of value-added with respect to the statutory tax. We show
that the marginal excess burden of the tax on suppliers is measured by this elasticity,
extending Feldsteins analysis of the elasticity of taxable income to an indirect tax
setting. We bring the theory to the data, using linked administrative VAT and corpor-
ation tax records in the UK from 2004-2009. Consistently with the theory, voluntary
registration is positively related to the intensity of input use and negatively related
to the share of B2C transactions. There is bunching at the VAT threshold, and the
amount of bunching is negatively related to the intensity of input use and positively re-
lated to the share of B2C transactions, again consistently with the theory. We provide
an estimate of the elasticity of the VAT tax base in the range of 0.09 and 0.18.
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1 Introduction
Most countries around the world use the value-added tax (VAT) as their primary indirect
tax, and most countries have thresholds, usually based on turnover, below which businesses
do not need to register for VAT.1 As VAT rates are often quite high (in excess of 20% in
many EU countries), this creates a large and salient tax notch for small businesses whose
turnover is around the threshold.2 So far, the e¤ect of these VAT notches has not been
analyzed in the literature.3
A recent literature on income tax notches (Kleven and Waseem (2013)), and transactions
tax notches in the housing market (Best and Kleven (2013) and Kopczuk and Munroe (2014))
emphasize that if individuals behave fully rationally, notches give rise to bunching below the
threshold, and holesabove the threshold where maximizing agents will not locate. These
papers use bunching at notches to estimate both the elasticity of labor supply, and the degree
of optimization friction.
However, the conceptual framework developed in these papers is not directly applicable
to VAT, for several reasons. First, with VAT, unlike the personal income tax, the e¤ective
rate of VAT paid on the marginal unit of value-added is determined not just by the tax
code, but also by other rm characteristics.4 First, even rms not registered for VAT pay
a positive e¤ective VAT rate, because they cannot recover tax paid on intermediate inputs.
Second, if a rm registered for VAT sells to another registered rm, it will automatically
simply pass on any change in the VAT charged on its outputs, because the buyer can claim
the output VAT back. So, rms that have mostly business-to-business (B2B) sales have a
lower e¤ective tax.5
Both these characteristics clearly di¤er widely across small rms that are close to the
registration threshold. For example, a small tradesperson such as a plumber or electrician
may typically have mostly B2Csales of his services to householders, and make relatively
light use of intermediate inputs. So, they would face a low e¤ective VAT rate when not
registered, but a high rate when registered. Conversely, a small specialist engineering rm,
such as a car component rm, may make mostly B2Bsales with heavy use of intermediate
1In the EU, all but two countries (Spain and Sweden) currently have positive thresholds, with the UK
threshold being the largest at £ 81,000. The thresholds in the EU are generally low compared with those in
countries that have more recently introduced a VAT, such as Singapore, which currently has a threshold of
about 540,000 Euro (retrieved from http://www.vatlive.com).
2A notch arises when the tax liability changes discontinuously.
3See Slemrod (2010) for a general discussion of tax notches; the VAT registration threshold is an example
of a quantity notch, in his terminology, which is relatively rare.
4In this respect, it is like the corporate tax, where it is well-known that the e¤ective marginal and average
rates of tax depend on the characteristics of the investments rms make.
5Follow conventional denition we refer to business sales to nal individual consumers as B2C sales.
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inputs, and so will be in the reverse position.
Second, these di¤erent characteristics give rise to the important feature of voluntary
registration, where a rm registers for VAT even if it is below the turnover threshold, and
thus not required to do so. This occurs when a rm has large purchases of intermediate
inputs, and/or they can pass most of VAT on output onto the purchaser, as in the case of
the car component rm; then, it may be protable to voluntarily register for VAT so they can
claim back input tax. In our data-set, over 44% of companies in the UK with turnover below
the threshold register voluntarily. Voluntary registration makes the VAT unique amongst all
major taxes and thus is worthy of investigation.
In this paper, we rst develop a conceptual framework for studying the two key aspects of
behavioral response to VAT including voluntary registration and bunching. This framework
is designed to be comparable to the framework rst developed by Saez (2010) to study
bunching at tax kinks, while capturing the distinctive features of VAT just mentioned. We
consider a number of rms producing a homogenous product from a purchased input and
the labor or managerial input of the rms owner. These rms can vary in e¢ ciency (the
basic source of heterogeneity that is the analog of labor productivity in Saez (2010)), and
also in the intensity with which they use the input, and the proportion of sales to non-VAT
registered consumers, i.e. so-called B2C sales.
We show rst in this setting that the e¤ect of the VAT system on prot can be captured
by a su¢ cient statistic, which we call the e¤ective VAT rate, which combines the e¤ects of
both input and output VAT; this rate will be di¤erent for registered and non-registered rms.
We then show that voluntary registration is more likely when either (i) the cost of inputs
relative to sales is high, or (ii) when the proportion of B2C sales is low.6 The intuition for
(ii) is simply that if most customers are VAT-registered, the burden of an increase VAT can
easily be passed on in the form of a higher price, because the customer himself can claim
back the increase. The intuition for (i) is that when input costs are important, registration
allows the rm to claim back a considerable amount of input VAT.
Second, we show that the determinants of bunching at the registration threshold are
the same as for voluntary registration, with the signs of the e¤ects reversed. Specically,
bunching is more likely when (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is low, or (ii) when the
proportion of B2C sales is high. We also show that the elasticity of value-added of registered
rms with respect to the e¤ective VAT rate can be recovered from an implicit function that
relates the degree of bunching to the elasticity of value-added, a formula very similar to that
of Kleven and Waseem (2013).
Finally, we show in the conceptual framework that the elasticity of value-added can be
6Note that exports, which are zero-rated, are classied as B2B sales.
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related in a simple way to the deadweight loss of a small increase in the statutory rate of
VAT, thus extending the well-known results of Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009) to an
indirect tax setting. To do this, we must assume that demand for the product is perfectly
elastic, so that the deadweight loss is measuring the loss of producer surplus in excess of
tax revenue raised. This assumption of perfectly elastic product demand is no stronger
conceptually than the assumption of a xed wage, i.e. perfectly elastic labor demand made
implicitly by Feldstein and Chetty.
We then bring these predictions to an administrative data-set created by linking the
population of corporation and VAT tax records in the UK. We rst show that the pattern
of voluntary registration in the data is consistent with the theory. In particular, voluntary
registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales or a high share of input costs.
Quantitatively, the probability that a rm voluntarily registers for VAT is increased by 0.05
for a one standard deviation increase in the share of B2C sales and by 0.02-0.05 for a one
standard deviation increase in the input cost ratio. The results are robust to use of either
a linear probability model or xed-e¤ects logit model, and to the inclusion of additional
rm-level control variables.
We then look at bunching. In the aggregate, there is clear evidence of bunching at the
VAT threshold. This is the rst evidence, to our knowledge, that a VAT notch leads to
bunching. Investigating further, we nd that rms are more likely to bunch at the threshold
when either (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (ii) when the proportion of
B2C sales is low, consistently with the theory. So, there is a clear pattern of heterogeneity
in bunching.
The next question is how it is that rms bunch; that is, what are the mechanism(s) at
work? One possibility is that they genuinely restrict their sales to stay below the threshold.
If so, the distribution of input-cost ratio should be smooth around the VAT notch. We
provide some suggestive evidence that part of bunching is driven by under-reporting of sales.
Specically, we nd that the salary-inclusive input cost ratio moves in the parallel direction
between the registered and non-registered group outside the bunching region but starts to
increase substantially for the non-registered companies just below the threshold. We interpret
the large and sharp increase in the salary-inclusive input cost ratio to be partly driven by
the fact that it is costly to underreport salary expenses due to third-party reporting.
Finally, we address the issue of the elasticity of value-added with respect to the tax. Our
approach gives an elasticity estimate of between 0.09 and 0.18, depending on what is assumed
about VAT registration costs. However, as further explained in Section 9, this estimate is
subject to several biases that work on opposite directions, and should be regarded with some
caution.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review related literature.
In section 3, we develop the conceptual framework to analyze VAT bunching and voluntary
registration. Sections 4 and 5 present the main empirical predictions, and results on welfare,
respectively. In section 6 we provide an overview of the VAT system in the UK and describe
the data. Sections 7 and 8 present the empirical analysis for voluntary registration and VAT
bunching, respectively. Section 9 estimates the elasticity of the tax base, and section 10
concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our work contributes to several strands of literature. First, our work relates to the literature
on the e¤ect of tax and regulatory thresholds, and in particular, the e¤ect of VAT thresholds
on small business behavior. The literature on VAT thresholds is small. In an important
paper, Keen and Mintz (2004) were the rst to set up a model of VAT including a threshold;
they show that there will be bunching below the threshold, and a holeabove, where rms
do not locate. However, there are a number of di¤erences between their approach and ours.7
First, their model is set up in such a way that none of the burden of output VAT can be
passed on to purchasers (all sales are to nal consumers) so it is never optimal for the rm
to voluntarily register. Given the large amount of voluntary registration that we observe in
the data, clearly, this is a limitation of their model.
Second, their main focus is on the optimal registration threshold, whereas our welfare
analysis concerns the marginal deadweight loss of an increase in the statutory rate of VAT,
following the literature on the elasticity of taxable income. Kanbur and Keen (2014) extend
the Keen and Mintz (2004) framework to allow for evasion, as well as avoidance, of VAT. In
our baseline model, we do not allow for evasion; the implications of doing so are discussed in
Section 2.3. Brashares et al. (2014) use a calibrated formula from Keen and Mintz (2004) to
infer that for a 10 percent VAT rate, the optimal level for the threshold in the United States
is $200,000.
Onji (2009) documents the e¤ects of the VAT threshold in Japan, focusing on the incent-
ives for a large rm to split by separately incorporating. A comparison of the corporate size
distributions before and after the VAT introduction of 1989 shows a clustering of corporations
just below the threshold. More broadly, there is a small literature on rm bunching below
non-VAT thresholds to avoid burdensome taxes and regulation; for example, in Spain, rms
with turnover above a 6 million Euro threshold face increased tax enforcement; Almunia
7The main focus of their paper is to study the optimal VAT threshold, a topic beyond the scope of this
paper.
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and Lopez Rodriguez (2014) show that rms bunch below this threshold to avoid increased
scrutiny of their tax returns.
Our work also contributes to the literature on the elasticity of the VAT base. There are a
small number of relevant contributions here. First, a number of studies (Carbonnier (2007)
for France, Kosonen (2013) and Kosonen and Harju (2013) for Finland) exploit large cuts
in the rate of VAT on specic categories of goods (e.g. restaurant meals and haircuts in
Finland) to estimate the percentage of the VAT cut passed on to consumers in the form of
lower prices. The general nding is that there is less than full tax pass-through, with pass-
through ranging from 80% to as low as 20%. We do not have price data and do not study
pass-through; rather, we look directly at the elasticity of the tax base. But, pass-through
is generally less than 100% in our model, because we allow for an upward-sloping marginal
cost curve for the rm.
Second, there are a very few studies that estimate the e¤ects of VAT cuts on quantities
as well as prices, and thus on the VAT base. The two studies for Finland estimate the
quantity responses to be very small, but do not quantify the overall e¤ect of the VAT cuts
on the VAT base. Blundell (2009) forecasts that the elasticity of tax base with respect to
a temporary cut in the standard rate of VAT in the UK from 17.5% to 15% between 1
December 2008 and 1 January 2010 to be between 0.25 and 1.8 This is a forward-looking
estimate, i.e. a prediction of the elasticity by assuming cost pass-though of between 75 and
100% and an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution in consumption of 0.5 to 1, rather than
being estimated from past observed behavior. Our estimates of the elasticity of the tax base
are closer to the Finnish studies than the Blundell estimate; one possible reason for this is
that the structural approach gives a long-run elasticity that should be interpreted as the
response to a permanent VAT change, whereas the Blundell calculation is for a temporary
change, where the elasticity will of course be higher, due to inter-temporal substitution in
consumption.
3 Conceptual Framework
3.1 The Set-Up
We consider a single industry with a xed, large number of small traders producing a ho-
mogenous good, indexed by productivity parameter a 2 [a; a]: Small trader a combines his
8Blundell (2009) claims that in the UK, between 75-100% of the VAT cut would be passed on to the
consumer, and based on the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, the elasticity of real consumption with
respect to the VAT cut would be 0.5-1.0. This gives an overall elasticity of the tax base of between 0.25 and
1.
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own labor input l with an intermediate input x to produce output y via a xed coe¢ cients
technology
y = amin
n
l;
x
a
o
; (1)
where a measures the productivity of the trader and  the input requirement. In particular,
for all traders, one unit of output requires  units of input: Let t be the rate of VAT. If the
trader is registered, he can claim back VAT on the input use x; so the price of the input is
r: If not registered, the price of the input is r(1 + t):
There are also two types of buyers, those who are not registered for VAT (consumers)
and those who are (businesses) in proportions  and 1   respectively. It is assumed both
types of buyers have perfectly elastic demand for the good at price p: This is analogous to the
assumption made in the taxable income literature that the wage is xed, i.e. labor demand
is perfectly elastic at a xed wage.
So, the prot for the non-registered trader is
(p  r(1 + t))y: (2)
For the registered trader, we reason as follows. The registered trader must charge VAT on
his output. If he sells to a registered buyer, all the VAT can be passed on, as the buyer can
reclaim it. So, revenue per unit sold to a registered buyer is p: On the other hand, none of
the output VAT can be passed on to the non-registered buyer, as he has perfectly elastic
demand. So, revenue per unit sold to a non-registered buyer is p=(1 + t): So, overall, the
prot for the registered trader is
p


1 + t
+ 1  

  r

y: (3)
Following Saez (2010) and Kleven and Waseem (2013), we assume that the trader has
an iso-elastic disutility of labor 1
1+ 1
e
l1+1=e. So, using (2) and (3), and recalling that l = y=a
from the production function (1), the utility for the registered and non-registered trader of
productivity a respectively can be written as
uR(y; a) = py


1 + t
+ 1  

  s)

  1
1 + 1
e
y
a
1+1=e
;
uN(y; a) = py (1  (1 + t)s))  1
1 + 1
e
y
a
1+1=e
;
where s = r=p is the share of inputs in total cost, and is an exogenous parameter in what
follows. As p as been assumed xed, we set it equal to 1 so that y denotes both output and
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the value of sales.
The VAT has a registration threshold; a rm must register if sales exceed y; but a rm
can register below this threshold if it wishes. If a rm chooses to register while producing
y < y; we say that it is voluntarily registered.
Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that there are signicant compliance costs to VAT
registration. It is well known that these costs, as a fraction of turnover, decline rapidly with
turnover; for example, a recent literature review found that at the registration threshold,
these costs were around 1.5% of turnover, declining to 0.1% or less for large companies
(Federation of Small Businesses, 2010). We model these as a xed cost K > 0; so that net
utility with registration is uR(y; a) K:
3.2 E¤ective VAT Rates
Note that uR; uN can be written
uR(y; a) = y(1  s)(1  tR)  1
1 + 1
e
y
a
1+1=e
; (4)
uN(y; a) = y(1  s)(1  tN)  1
1 + 1
e
y
a
1+1=e
;
tR =
t
(1 + t)(1  s) ; tN =
st
1  s: (5)
That is, revenue net of input costs, y(1   s); or value-added, is taxed at e¤ective rate tR if
registered, and tN if not. Note that tR is increasing in the B2C ratio, ; and increasing in s;
whereas tN is increasing in s: Obviously, both e¤ective rates are increasing in the statutory
rate, t.
Whether we have voluntary registration or bunching, or neither, is driven by the rela-
tionship of tR to tN : It may seem implausible that we can have tN larger than tR in practice.
However, as we will show below, given the values of s and  in our data, almost half the
sample face this conguration of e¤ective taxes.
To interpret e, note rst that from (4), the output that maximizes uR(y; a) is
yR(a) = a
1+e((1  s)(1  tR))e; (6)
and also from (5), the output that maximizes uN(y; a) subject to the registration constraint
y  y is min fyR(a); yg ; where
yN(a) = a
1+e((1  s)(1  tN))e: (7)
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Thus, e measures the elasticity of output supply with respect to the e¤ective taxes. Note also
that the value-added of the trader is simply v = y(1   s); so e also measures the elasticity
of the individual traders value-added with respect to the e¤ective taxes.
3.3 Discussion
One possible objection is that our analytical framework might seem very special; rms sell a
homogenous product, and there is no substitution between inputs and the managerial labor
input. We have two responses to this. First, both of these assumptions can be relaxed at the
cost of some more analytical complexity. In a not-for-publication Appendix, 9 we present a
version of our model with di¤erentiated products and a more general production function;
then, it can be shown that the impact of the VAT system on the prot of the trader can
no longer be measured just by an e¤ective tax rate, but by a parameter that we call the
discouragement index, which is itself a function of t; s;and  as here, but also of the rm-
level elasticity of demand, and the elasticity of substitution between labor and the produced
inputs. Many of the qualitative results extend to this case.
Second, while our model has some special features, it can be argued that it is in fact
more general than the Saez (2010) framework, also used by Kleven and Waseem (2013),
used to study the personal income tax, where a worker with utility linear in consumption
and iso-elastic labor supply faces a xed pre-tax wage and a kinked or notched income tax
schedule. In the Saez/Kleven-Waseem set-up, because the worker takes his pre-tax wage as
given, he bears the full burden of the tax. In our setting, this corresponds to the assumption
that no customer can reclaim VAT ( = 1); then, the trader bears the full burden of VAT.
Moreover, in a labor supply setting, there is no input tax; in our setting, this corresponds
to the case where s = 0. Finally, we also have a compliance cost of registration, K; in the
Saez/Kleven-Waseem set-up, there are no compliance costs of moving over a tax notch, but
there is a pure notchor lump-sum change in the tax liability, T in their notation, which
plays the same role. So, under the assumptions that  = 1 and s = 0, our model reduces
mathematically to the Kleven-Waseem model.10
A further point is that it has been argued that amount of output exported is a determinant
of registration, because in practice, exports are exempt from VAT, and so rms that export
more of their output are more likely to register (Brashares et al., 2014). Note that our model
covers this case, because exports can be thought of as B2Bsales. This is because in the
case of exports, the supplier does not bear any of the burden of the output VAT, and so from
9This is available from the authors on request.
10Formally, with  = 1; s = 0; our model is equivalent to a variant of their model where their higher rate
of income tax above the notch,  + = t1+t , and where  = 0; T = K:
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the suppliers point of view, domestic B2B sales and exports are equivalent in this respect.
A limitation of our model is that we do not allow for evasion.11 Estimated evasion of the
VAT in the UK is currently around 11% of potential revenues (HM Revenue and Customs,
2015). Following Chetty (2009), one way to incorporate an evasion option would be to say
that a rm with real turnover y can hide an amount h of turnover at cost g(h); where g(:)
is increasing and convex. It is then easy to show that with an evasion option, there will be
more bunching at the notch than without. This in turn implies that some of the observed
bunching will be due to evasion, rather than the underlying elasticity of output supply, so
that using bunching to infer e; as we do below, will tend to over-estimate e: However, without
knowing something about the cost of evasion function, we cannot correct our estimates of e
for this factor.12
4 The Registration Decision
4.1 The Cut-O¤
Recall that the VAT has a registration threshold at y; but a rm can register below this
threshold, and that there is also a compliance cost K of registering. The payo¤ from regis-
tration is thus uR(a); where uR(a)  uR(yR(a); a)  K; and the payo¤ from not registering
is uN(a)  uN(min fyR(a); yg ; a): Then, the net gain to registering is(a) = uR(a) uN(a);
so a rm will register i¤(a)  0:We rst provide a basic characterization of the registration
decision.
Proposition 1. Given xed values for the other parameters, there is a critical ~a such that
all rms with a  ~a register for VAT and all a < ~a do not.
The intuition is the following. First, the higher a, the higher is optimal output, and so
the xed cost of registration is less important in overall revenue. Second, the cost of meeting
the registration turnover constraint y  y is higher, the higher is a:
4.2 Voluntary Registration
The rst aspect of the registration decision that we are interested in is voluntary registration.
Recall that a rm a chooses voluntary registration if it chooses to register, and has a turnover
11The e¤ects of an evasion or non-compliance option at tax notches are also discussed in Kanbur and
Keen (2014), and where two forms of evasion are studied, total avoidance (bounders), and avoidance of some
fraction of the tax (cads).
12Chetty (2009) discusses some methods for estimating the marginal cost of evasion.
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below the threshold i.e. yR(a) < y. Our empirical predictions concern the share of the rms
who produce below the threshold who register voluntarily.
Let aR be the rm type which, if registered, just wants to produce at the registration
threshold i.e. from (6), aR =

y
((1 s)(1 tR))e
1=(1+e)
: From Proposition 1, if ~a < aR; all rms
between ~a and aR register voluntarily; otherwise, none do. So, recalling that a is distributed
uniformly, the share of rms producing less than y which are registered voluntarily is
v = max

aR   ~a
aR
; 0

(8)
Now we have:
Proposition 2. (i) There is a summary statistic of the parameters,
 =
(1  tR)1+e   (1  tN)1+e
(1  tR)e ;
such that v > 0 i¤  > K(1+e)
y = 0; and v is strictly increasing in  if  > 0 i.e. tN must
be su¢ ciently larger than tR. (ii) The share of voluntary registrations v is decreasing in
the B2C ratio : (iii) There is a critical value d1 tN
1 tR < 1 above which the share of voluntary
registrations, v; is increasing in the share of input costs in turnover s:
The intuition for this is as follows. When tN is su¢ ciently above tR; even a rm will
a relatively low productivity a will be willing to pay the xed cost of registration to take
advantage of the lower tax rate with registration. But, when tN is just above above tR,
i.e. where 0    0 the critical cuto¤ is ~a = aR; all rms with a < ~a will be non-
registered and produce below the threshold, and all rms with a > ~a will produce at level
a1+e((1   s)(1   tR))e strictly greater than y: So, for this parameter range, there is no
voluntary registration (but no bunching, either). This in fact implies that when tN is just
above above tR; there will be a hole above the threshold.13
4.3 Bunching
Now consider that group of rms for which ; s are such that voluntary registration is not
optimal i.e. for which tR > tN . Note that this group has the full range of productivity a.
In this case, it is easy to show that there is bunching at the cuto¤. In particular, let a be
the rm which just produces at the threshold when non-registered i.e. yN(a). Then, all
13The smallest output above the threshold is y  = (aR)1+e((1 s)(1  tR))e > (aR)1+e((1 s)(1  tN ))e =
y:
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rms between a and ~a will produce at the threshold, with any rm a < a < ~a restricting
its output to avoid paying the registration cost and the higher e¤ective tax. So, now, ~a is
the rm that is just indi¤erent between holding its output at y to avoid registration, and
incurring the costs of registration. So, ~a must be dened by the condition
max
y

y(1  s)(1  tR)  1
1 + 1
e
y
~a
1+1=e
 K = y(1 s)(1  tN)  1
1 + 1
e

y
~a
1+1=e
: (9)
Now dene a  ~a   a; so that ~a  a + a. So, all rms located between a and
a+a in the productivity distribution bunch at the threshold. However, we do not observe
a directly, only y, so we need to map the bunching interval into the space of turnover. To
do this, note that in the absence of bunching, the critical rm a+a would have turnover
y +y = (a +a)((1  s)(1  tR))e: So, the percentage turnover response to the notch
is measured by y=y: Then we can show:
Proposition 3. Given e; the level of bunching y is given by the implicit relationship
1
(1 + y=y)

1 +
K=y
(1  s)(1  tN)

  1
1 + 1=e

1
1 + y=y
1+1=e
 

1  tR
1  tN
1+e
1
1 + e
= 0:
(10)
Note that (10) is very closely related to the Kleven-Waseem formula relating bunching at
a notch of the personal income tax schedule to the elasticity of the labor supply e; the latter
is given by equation (5) in their paper, which, in our notation, is
1
(1 + y=y)

1 +
T=y
1  

  1
1 + 1=e

1
1 + y=y
1+1=e
 

1  
1  
1+e
1
1 + e
= 0;
(11)
where  is the initial rate of income tax, andT;  are the notches i.e. when pre-tax income
goes above y; a xed penalty T is paid, and then all income is taxed at rate + : There
are two di¤erences between (10) and (11). First, with the VAT, the compliance cost, K takes
the place of T: Second, tN ; tR replace  ;  + :
We can now use (10) to look at some of the determinants of bunching. It turns out that
the su¢ cient statistic  helps determine bunching, as well as voluntary registrations. We
have:
Proposition 4. (i) If tR  tN ; there is strictly positive bunching,y=y > 0: (ii) If
tR < tN ; there is positive bunching as long as   1  0

1 tN
1 tR
e
, and 0 < 1 < 0; where
; 0 are dened in Proposition 2: (iii) The amount of bunching y
 rises (a) as ; the
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fraction of B2C sales increases, and (b) for K small, as the share of inputs in total cost, s,
falls.
The intuition for this is straightforward. if tR  tN ; any rm contemplating registration
will face both (i) a higher e¤ective tax when registering, and (ii) a registration cost. So,
if it would prefer to produce just a bit more than y when facing tN ; it will certainly wish
to bunch. This argument continues to apply even when tR < tN ; until the tax advantage
outweighs the registration cost, at which point, bunching is eliminated.
4.4 Summary of Theoretical Results
We can now summarize the theoretical results so far in gure 1. To do this, we assume that
the su¢ cient statistic  is increasing in the ratio s=; su¢ cient conditions for this to be the
case are identied in Proposition 2. Figure 1 shows that there are three possible regimes,
depending on parameter values.
Start in the rst regime where tN < tR and there is bunching, but no voluntary regis-
tration. We see that as s increases, or  decreases, the fraction of rms who are bunching
decreases until we move to a second regime, where tN is close to tR; but a bit larger, where
there is neither bunching nor voluntary registration. In this second regime, the critical cuto¤
is ~a = aR; all rms with a < ~a will produce below the threshold, and all rms with a > ~a
will produce at level a1+e((1  s)(1  tR))e strictly greater than y. This in fact implies that
there will be a hole above the threshold.14 Finally, when tN is su¢ ciently larger than tR; we
move to the voluntary registration regime.
5 Welfare
In this section, we show how ethe elasticity of output supply with respect to the e¤ective
taxes tR; tNcan be related to the deadweight loss of the VAT. Assume that all rms have
the same s; ; so that they only vary in a: Following Chetty (2009), our welfare criterion is
W = U + T; where U is the average utility across all rms i.e.
U =
~aZ
0
uN(a)da+
aZ
~a
(uR(a) K)da
14The smallest output above the threshold is y  = (aR)1+e((1 s)(1  tR))e > (aR)1+e((1 s)(1  tN ))e =
y:
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and where T is tax revenue. The term U has the interpretation of aggregate producer surplus.
The term T has two components, the VAT charged on the sales of registered rms, and the
VAT charged on the inputs of non-registered rms. So, overall,
T = ts
~aZ
0
yN(a)da+
t
1 + t
aZ
~a
yR(a)da (12)
= tNVN + tRVR; VN =
~aZ
0
(1  s)yN(a)da; VR =
aZ
~a
(1  s)yR(a)da
where, in the second line, we write tax revenue in a more standard way as the sum of e¤ective
rates tN ; tR for non-registered and registered forms respectively, times the corresponding tax
bases i.e. value added of registered and non-registered rms VR; VN :
As in Chetty (2009), we measure the deadweight loss of an increase in the VAT rate by
dW
dt
: The rst, and simplest, case is where there is voluntary registration, i.e. tR > tN : It is
then possible to show the following:
Proposition 5. If tR < tN ; so that there is voluntary registration, then the deadweight
loss of a small tax increase is
dW
dt
=

tN
@VN
@t
+ tR
@VR
@t

j~a const| {z } +
@T
@~a
@~a
@t| {z }
intensive DWL extensive DWL
: (13)
Moreover, the intensive DWL, as a fraction of the additional revenue raised mechanically,
@tN
@t
VN +
@tR
@t
VR; can be written
 e

N
tN
1  tN + (1  N)
tR
1  tR

; (14)
where N =
VN
@tN
@t
@tN
@t
VN+
@tR
@t
VR
: Finally, the extensive DWL is proportional to K1=(1+e); and van-
ishes as K ! 0:
Formula (13) is a variant of the Feldstein-Chetty formula in for the deadweight loss of a
proportional income tax, dW
dt
= tdTI
dt
; where TI is taxable income, and t is the proportional
rate of income tax. It di¤ers in two ways. First, there is also the e¤ect of the tax on welfare
via the change in registrations, measured by @T
@~a
@~a
@t
; which we call the deadweight loss at the
extensive margin, or extensive DWL: Second, in this case, there are two tax bases VN ; VR and
two e¤ective taxes, tN ; tR; so the formula is more complex. The fact that the intensive DWL
14
can be written proportional to e is again analogous to the Feldstein-Chetty formula, which
can be written dW
dt
=TI =  e t
1 t ; where e is the elasticity of taxable income with respect to
t:
Now consider the case with tR > tN ; where there is bunching. Now, the main di¤erences
are twofold. First, as all non-registered rms between a and ~a bunch, we have:
yN(a) =
(
a1+e(1  tN)e; a  a  (y)1=(1+e)(1 tN )e=(1+e)
y a < a  ~a
: (15)
Second, the formula for ~a is now rather di¤erent. As a consequence of (15),we have a di¤erent
formula for tax revenue i.e.
T = tN(VN + VB) + tRVR; VN =
aZ
0
(1  s)yN(a)da; VB =
~aZ
a
(1  s)yda; (16)
and VR is as before, so VB is the value-added of the bunchers. Note also (i) for a xed a; ~a;
VB does not respond to t; (ii) from (16), and the fact that by denition, yN(a) = y; the
e¤ect of a change in a on tax revenue is zero; @T
@a = 0: Then, we have:
Proposition 6. If tR > tN ; so that there is bunching, formula (13) continues to hold.
But now, the intensive DWL, as a fraction of the additional revenue raised mechanically,
@tN
@t
(VN + VB) +
@tR
@t
VR; can be written
 e

N
tN
1  tN + R
tR
1  tR

(17)
where N =
VN
@tN
@t
@tN
@t
(VN+VB)+
@tR
@t
VR
; R =
VR
@tR
@t
@tN
@t
(VN+VB)+
@tR
@t
VR
So, now, there are two di¤erences to Proposition 5. First, in (17) the weights on tN ; tR are
slightly di¤erent. Second, from the di¤erent denition of ~a in (9) ; the detailed formula for
the extensive DWL is di¤erent, and that term does not vanish as K ! 0:
Note nally that these welfare results apply only to producer surplus, or to put it another
way, they characterize the marginal deadweight loss of the VAT under the assumption that
output demand is perfectly elastic. This may seem restrictive, but it is conceptually no more
restrictive than the assumption implicitly made by Feldstein and Chetty that labor demand
is perfectly elastic.
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6 Context and Data
6.1 The Value-Added Tax System in the UK
The Value-Added tax in the UK is paid by approximately 2 million registered businesses in
each scal year.15 It is the third largest source of government revenue following income tax
and national insurance contributions. In 2011/12, VAT raised £ 98.23 billion, accounting for
21.05% of total tax revenue and 6.54% of GDP in the UK.16
VAT is levied on most goods and services provided by registered businesses in the UK,
goods and some services imported from countries outside the European Union, and brought
into the UK from other EU countries.17 All businesses must register for VAT if their taxable
turnover is above a given threshold.18 The current registration threshold is £ 81,000 in
2014/15. As permitted by the EU VAT law, increases in the registration threshold should be
in line with the rate of ination.19 The UK currently set the highest registration threshold
in the EU, which is perceived as a way for the government to reduce the compliance costs
of small businesses not wishing to register for VAT.20
A business pays VAT on its purchasesknown as input tax, and charges VAT on the
full sale price of the taxable suppliesknown as output tax. Businesses can also choose
to register voluntarily with a turnover below the threshold in order to recover the input
taxes. The default VAT rate is the standard rate, which was 17.5% between April 1, 2004
and December 1, 2008 and was temporarily reduced to 15% before January 1, 2010. The
standard rate was then reverted to 17.5% until 4 January 2011 when it was increased to
20% and has been at that rate since. A small number of goods and services are charged at a
reduced rate of 5% and there are also goods and services that are charged at a zero rate or
exempt from VAT altogether.21 Neither businesses that make zero-rate or exempt supplies
15Authorsestimates based on the universe of UK VAT records between 2004/05 and 2010/11.
16See http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/tax receipts/tax-receipts-and-taxpayers.pdf.
17There are complex regulations for goods and services imported from within the EU.
18VAT taxable turnover includes the value of any goods or services a business supplies within the UK,
unless they are exempt from VAT. Any supplies that would be zero-rated for VAT are included as part of
the taxable turnover.
19Specically, under Article 24(2)(c) of the sixth EC VAT directive (77/388/EEC 17 May 1977). These
provisions are now consolidated in the principal VAT directive (2006/112/EC); article 287 allows for States
to increase the registration threshold in line with ination.
20See http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#vat. Among all OECD countries, Denmark
has the lowest threshold, which requires businesses with sales of more than DKK 50,000 (GBP£ 4,308) to
register. There is no VAT threshold in Mexico, Sweden, and Spain so that all businesses in these countries
are required to register unless exempt otherwise.
21A reduced rate of 5% is charged on a small number of supplies under schedule 7A of the Value Added
Tax Act (VATA) 1994. Principally, they include the supply of domestic fuel and power, the installation of
energy saving materials, womens sanitary products, childrens car seats and certain types of construction
work.
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charge output VAT to the customers, and the key di¤erence between them is that input tax
cannot be claimed against output tax on exempted supplies.
Small rms with annual taxable turnover of up to £ 150,000 can use a simplied at-rate
VAT scheme, which was introduced in 2002 and allows rms to pay VAT at a single rate
on their total sales.22 The at rate, which varies between 4% and 14.5% depending on the
industry, is intended to reect the average VAT rate in each industry and reduce the compli-
ance cost associated with keeping detailed records and calculating VAT for each transaction
separately. In practice, the extent of such administrative savings is rather unclear, since
rms must keep similar records to calculate and compare their VAT liability under both the
standard scheme and the at-rate scheme in order to decide whether to join or leave the
at-rate scheme. As discussed in a 2007 Public Accounts Committee report and in Vesal
(2013), the take-up rate for the at-rate scheme among eligible rms are extremely low and
most eligible rms are registered under the standard scheme.23
There are two rules governing registration, a forward-looking rule and a backward-looking
one. First, a rm must also register for VAT if either (i) the VAT taxable turnover of the rm
may go over the threshold in the next 30 days alone, or the rm takes over a VAT-registered
business as a going concern. Second, a rm must register for VAT if its VAT-taxable turnover
for the previous 12 months was more than the threshold. Strictly speaking, our theoretical
model applies to the forward-looking decision, as the model is static; that is, the rm must
register if turnover in the current year is expected to exceed the threshold. In our sample,
among rms that register for the rst time, around 68% of them have turnover in the
previous year lower than the VAT notch. This suggests that the forward-looking decision is
more important.
VAT compliance in the UK has been long susceptible to fraud and avoidance. According
to HMRC estimates, the VAT tax gap, which is dened as the di¤erence between net theor-
etical tax liabilities and total VAT receipts on a timely basis, is around 10.4% of theoretical
VAT liability since 2010. This is considerably higher than the tax gap estimates for many
other taxes in the UK except for tobacco duties and self assessment. The most recent estim-
ate of the £ 11.4 billion VAT gap in 2011-12, is composed of (1) £ 0.5 1.0 billion of MTIC
22Under the at-rate sheme, rms surrender the right to reclaim VAT on inputs. The turnover ceiling for
FRS has been increased from £ 100,000 when it was introduced in 2002 to £ 150,000 since 2003.
23In October 2007, the Public Accounts Committee published a report on new businesstax obligations
and found that out of 705,000 eligible businesses, only 16% of rms were registered under the at-rate
scheme. A more recent study Vesal (2013) also nds that twenty six percent of eligible VAT traders gain
from the at-rate scheme but very few join the scheme. Both studies attribute the low takeup rate to the
lack of awareness of the at-rate scheme scheme.
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(Missing Trader Intra-Community) fraud,24 (2) £ 1.8 billion of VAT debt,25 (3) £ 0.2 billion
due to VAT avoidance (HM Revenue and Customs, 2015).
Table 1 summarizes the source of variation in the VAT tax system that we explore in
empirical analysis. As shown in column 1, there is the discrete jump in the tax rate and the
overall VAT liability at the registration threshold. The registration threshold was £ 58,000 in
2004/05, has been increased annually to £ 68,000 in 2009/10, and is currently £ 81,000 since
2014/15. We analyze the excess number of rms bunching below the threshold to estimate the
elasticity of the turnover with respect to the standard rate of VAT in a structural approach.
In addition, there is a temporary reduction in the main rate of VAT between December 1,
2008 and January 1, 2010, which was the main lever of a scal stimulus package to counter
the recession. As shown in column 3, the standard rate of VAT was temporarily reduced to
15 percent on 1 December 2008 and returned to 17.5 percent on 1 January 2010.
6.2 Data
We construct our dataset by linking the universe of VAT returns to the universe of corpora-
tion tax records in the UK. The rst data set provides VAT tax information for businesses in
di¤erent legal forms including sole traders, partnerships, and companies but only for those
who are registered. To obtain information on non-VAT registered businesses, we link the
VAT records to the population of corporation tax records based on a common anonymised
taxpayer reference number. The linked dataset allows us to identify VAT registers and non-
registers for the population of UK companies, and contains rich information on VAT and
corporation tax for each company and year.
We further merge the linked tax dataset with two additional data sources: (1) annual
company accounts from the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) database for additional
rm characteristics and accounting information26 and (2) annual sector-level statistics on
the share of sales to nal consumers, which are derived from the O¢ ce of National Statistics
(ONS) Input-Output Tables and are available at 2-digit SIC industry level. The last data
source gives us an empirical proxy for ; the share of sales that are B2C.
We take the following steps to rene the sample to better study the VAT registration
decisions of individual companies. First, we eliminate companies which are part of a larger
24MTIC VAT fraud is an organised criminal attack on the EU VAT system in which fraudulent traders
acquire goods and services VAT free from EU Member States by charging VAT on their onward sale and
disappear to avoid paying the VAT charged to the relevant tax authorities.
25VAT debt is dened as the di¤erence between new debts arising in the nancial year and debt payments
plus debt adjustments made in the nancial year.
26FAME database is published by Bureau van Dijk and contains detailed nancial information for more
than 1.9 million companies in the UK and Ireland.
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VAT group and focus only on standard-alone independent companies. This is because com-
panies under common controlfor example subsidiaries of a parent companycan register as
a VAT group and submit only one VAT return for all companies in a VAT group.
Second, because the registration decision can be based on turnover in the previous 12
months, we drop all observations with partial-year corporation tax records. In addition, we
eliminate companies that mainly engage in overseas activities based on the HMRC trade
classication since the taxable VAT turnover is based on sales of goods and services within
the UK. Finally, we drop companies with an e¤ective rate of VAT that is less than 10%27,
which roughly corresponds to the bottom 10% of the e¤ective output rate for all rms that
are registered for VAT. This is the main sample we use for empirical analysis.
The nal dataset contains 1,408,517 observations for 435,688 companies between April 1,
2004 and March 30, 2010. For each company-year observation, we have information on the
VAT-exclusive turnover taken from the corporate tax records, and whether it is registered
for VAT.28 We also observe a few key factors that drive rmsdecisions about voluntary
registration, including the share of input cost relative to total turnover (input-cost ratio),
the share of sales to nal consumers (B2C sales ratio), and rm-specic history of registration
status.
We use three di¤erent datasets from the main sample to test related hypotheses de-
veloped in Section 4. First, we use all the rms with turnover below the current-year VAT
registration threshold to examine the choice of voluntary registration. We say that a rm
is voluntarily registered when it has a current-year turnover below the VAT notch and has
never registered before, or has current-year turnover below the VAT deregistration threshold
and was registered in the previous year. In the main sample, 62.49% of rms have a turnover
below the VAT threshold, and of these, 44.12% of them are registered for VAT. So, over-
all, 27.56% of rms in the main sample of companies with turnover between £ 10,000 and
£ 200,000 are voluntarily registered for VAT.
To analyze the extent of bunching below the VAT notch hypothesized in Section 4.3, we
27The e¤ective rate is calculated as the output VAT paid relative to VAT-eligible sales for registered
companies.
28Our empirical analysis is based on turnover reported in the CT600 for two reasons. The rst is mechan-
ical: we only observe turnover liable for VAT for rms that are registered. The second is related to salience
given that rms that are not registered for VAT are more likely to base their registration decision on the
overall amount of turnover, instead of computing a separate measure of turnover that is subject to VAT. To
see whether this is true, we predict (out-of-sample) the amount of turnover liable for VAT for unregistered
rms, by regressing the amount of turnover liable for VAT on the amount of total turnover and a full set of
industry and year dummies. We then plot a similar histogram of turnover as in Figure 2 Panel B based on
actual/predicted turnover liable for VAT for registered/unregistered rm. Bunching below the VAT notch
is still present, but much more noisy and imprecise comparing to bunching based on total turnover reported
in CT600. The empirical di¤erences suggest that for unregistered rms, they are more likely to rely on the
overall turnover gure for their VAT registration decisions.
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split companies in the main sample into those for which voluntary registration is not optimal
(the predicted bunching sample) and those for which voluntary registration is optimal (the
registration sample). The bunching sample comprises rms which are predicted to bunch as
they face a higher e¤ective tax when registering, i.e. tR  tN ; and the remainder comprise
the registration sample. From equation (5,) we dene the predicted bunching sample to
be rms in industries where the average B2C ratio () and input cost ratio (s) satisfy the
condition that s= < 1=(1 + t); where t is the statutory VAT rate. The bunching sample
dened this way is roughly one third of the main sample, and we use just this sample to
examine bunching at the registration threshold. In this way, we minimize the noisearound
the VAT notch from rms who are voluntarily registering.
6.3 Summary Statistics
Figure 2 presents convincing evidence that the VAT registration threshold is binding in
the UK. In Panel A, there is a discrete jump in the share of registered companies at the
normalized VAT notch during 2004/05-2009/10, with a substantial number of voluntary
registers below the threshold. On average, around 40.93% of companies with a turnover
below the current-year VAT notch are registered for VAT, suggesting that for these companies
the benets of being registered to reclaim the input taxes may well outweigh the costs.
The share of registers increases considerably to around 85% once reaching the threshold,
with non-VAT registered companies above the threshold consisting of three types: (1) those
providing exempt supplies, (2) those providing primarily zero-rated supplies, and (3) those
with turnover temporarily exceeding the threshold. Panel B further shows a histogram
of nominal turnover net of current-year VAT notch by pooling data between 2004/05 and
2009/10. That is, the VAT notch that is normalized to zero. There is an evident excess
of mass just below the notch, and a small missing mass above, in the otherwise smooth
distribution of turnover.
However, it is also worth noting that relative to some other studies, the excess mass below
the threshold is not sharply bunched at the notch. A plausible explanation is that rms have
less control over their turnover than individuals do over their earnings for example.
Table 2 provides summary statistics for companies in the neighborhood of current-year
VAT notch, which include all companies with a nominal turnover between £ 10,000 and
£ 200,000 over the sample period. Column 1-3 shows the mean, standard deviation and
the number of non-missing observations for the key variables used in empirical analysis.
Companies in this turnover region account for around 52.94% of all companies in the linked
dataset. Columns 4-6 focus on the registered companies while columns 7-9 focus on the non
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registered. The last two columns test whether there is any signicant di¤erence between
the means of the two groups, by reporting the t statistic and the corresponding p-value in
column 9 and 10, respectively. There are a total of 745,714 observations for 267,764 unique
companies in the sample, and around 62% of them are registered for VAT. On average,
registered companies have a signicantly higher turnover and trading prot comparing to
non-registered companies. Consistent with Propositions 2 and 4, registered companies on
average have a signicantly higher input-cost ratio and B2C sales ratio.
7 Evidence on Voluntary Registration
In this section, we examine whether the empirical pattern of voluntary registration is consist-
ent with the theory in the two key aspects as predicted by proposition 1, i.e. whether a rm
is more likely to voluntarily register for VAT if it mainly sells to nal consumers, and/or it
has a large share of inputs in cost. We rst note in Table 3 that voluntary registration varies
with the share of B2C sales and with the share of inputs in cost in a way that is consistent
with the theory. As the share of B2C sales falls, i.e. when moving from the fourth (Q4) to
rst quartile (Q1) of the distribution of B2C sales ratio, the share of voluntarily registered
rms tends to rise. Similarly, as the input cost ratio rises, the share of voluntarily registered
rms tends to increase. The empirical pattern is broadly consistent with Proposition 2. To
investigate further, Figure 3 plots the distribution of the B2C sales ratio and the input cost
ratio by registration status, for all rms below the threshold. The empirical pattern is again
broadly consistent with Proposition 2, as for all rms with a turnover below the VAT notch,
those who are voluntarily registered tend to have a lower B2C sales ratio and a higher input
cost ratio compared to their non-registered counterparts.29
Finally, we model the decision of voluntary registration as a function of the B2C sales
ratio and the input cost ratio in a binary choice model of the following form:
Rit = 1 + 2B2Cj(i) + 3ICRit + 4Xit + t + i + it; (18)
where Rit represents the binary voluntary registration variable which takes on the value 1
if a rm is voluntarily registered for VAT and 0 otherwise. The key variables of interest
are B2Cj(i), the industry-level B2C ratio for rm i (that is, rm i in industry j(i)), and
ICRit, the input cost ratio for rm i in year t. Also, Xit are other rm-level controls, i
and t are time-invariant rm xed e¤ects and year dummies, and it is the error term. We
29The peaks in the density shown in gure 3 panel A is due to limited variation in the B2C ratio across
rms, as we can only measure the B2C ratios roughly at the 2-digit SIC industry level.
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rst estimate equation (18) in a linear probability framework based on the standard OLS
assumptions. To check the robustness of the estimation results, we reestimate equation (18)
in a xed-e¤ect logit model which assumes that the error term follows a logistic distribution.
The results are shown in Table 4. Columns (1)-(4) present estimation results from the
linear probability model and columns (5)-(8) present estimation results from the xed-e¤ects
logit model. While the magnitude of the coe¢ cients are not directly comparable between
the two models, it is assuring that they have the same sign and similar signicance level.30
Column (1) and (5) do not include rm xed e¤ects and allow us to examine the e¤ect of
industry-level B2C sales ratio on the probability of voluntary registration. The coe¢ cient
estimates are negative and statistically signicant, indicating that the likelihood for a rm
to voluntarily register for VAT is reduced by around 0.04 given a one standard deviation
increase in the B2C sales ratio.
The rest of the specications add rm xed e¤ects and the coe¢ cient on the B2C sales
ratio becomes often imprecisely estimated due to its limited variation at the industry level
over time. For comparison, columns (2) and (6) do not include any additional rm-level
controls while column (3) and (7) include rm-level trading prot and age as additional
control variables. Columns (4) and (8) check the robustness of the results by replacing the
salary-inclusive input cost ratio with the salary-exclusive input cost ratio calculated from
FAME. Given that few rms report the direct cost of sales, the sample size is dramatically
decreased but nevertheless the coe¢ cient estimate for the input cost ratio remains positive
and highly signicant. Moreover, the coe¢ cient estimate for the B2C sales ratio is negative
and signicant at 10% level. Focusing on results in columns (3) and (4), the likelihood
of voluntarily registering for VAT is increased by around 0.01-0.05 given a one standard
deviation increase in the input cost ratio.
To further investigate the robustness of our results to the limited variation in the B2C
ratio roughly at the 2-digit SIC industry level, we compute the share of rms that are
voluntarily registered in each year, and regress it against the industry-level B2C sales ratio
and input cost ratio. The results are presented in Table 5 and are fairly consistent with
ndings from the rm-level regression analysis. The coe¢ cient estimate for the B2C sales
ratio is negative and highly signicant in the pooled regressions in columns (1)-(4) without
inclusion of industry xed e¤ects, and becomes positive and imprecisely estimated in columns
(5)-(8) with inclusion of industry xed e¤ects. Similar to results from rm-level regressions
30Following the rule of thumb as suggested in (Wooldridge, 2001, p. 465-468), we divide the logit estimates
by four to make them roughly comparable to the LPM estimates. The scaled logit estimates are comparable
to the liner probability model (LPM) estimates. We use the LPM estimates to infer the average partial
e¤ects of our key variables of interest on the response probability since the xed e¤ects logit estimator does
not allow for estimation of partial e¤ects.
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based on equation (18), the coe¢ cient estimate for the average input cost ratio is positive
and highly signicant in the pooled regressions without inclusion of industry xed e¤ects.
The loss of signicance is due to limited variation over time in the two variables of interest
at the industry level.
8 Evidence on Bunching
8.1 Estimation Methodology
As set out in the conceptual framework in Section 3, the VAT registration threshold at
the cuto¤ turnover value y will induce excess bunching at the threshold by companies for
which voluntary registration is not optimal. The bunching is driven by the productivity
parameter a, and will generate an excess mass by companies who would have reported a
turnover between y and y +y absent the notch of
B(y) =
Z y+y
y
g(y)d(y) ' g(y)y;
where B(y) is the excess mass at the threshold and g(y) is the counterfactual density
distribution of turnover had there been no registration threshold. The approximation is
accurate to the extent that g(y) is uniform around the notch.
By grouping companies into small turnover bins of £ 100, we estimate the counterfactual
distribution around the VAT notch y in the following regression:
cj =
qX
l=0
i (yj)
l +
y+X
i=y 
iI fj = ig+ "j; (19)
where cj is the number of companies in turnover bin j, yj is the distance between turnover
bin j and the VAT notch y, q is the order of the polynomial, and I fg is an indicator
function. The range
 
y ; y

+

in the second term species turnover bins around the notch
where bunching occurs and are therefore excluded from the regression. The lower bound of
the excluded turnover region, y , is set at the point where excess bunching starts. The upper
bound of the excluded region, y+, is estimated in an iteration procedure to ensure that the
area under the estimated counterfactual density is equal the area under the observed density.
In other words, the estimation procedure ensures that the excess mass below the VAT notch
is equal to the missing mass above. The error term "j reects misspecication of the density
equation.
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The estimated counterfactual distribution is dened as the predicted bin counts bcj from
(19) omitting the contribution of the dummies in the excluded region
 
y ; y

+

, and excess
bunching is estimated as the di¤erence between the observed and predicted bin counts over
the excluded range that falls below the VAT notch:
bB = yX
i=y 
(cj   bcj):
We use the excess mass B(y) and counterfactual distribution g(y) to recover the bunching
ratio b(y) = B(y) =g(y), which denotes the fraction of companies that bunch at the notch
relative to the counterfactual density and approximates y under the assumption of no
optimization frictions. We follow this process year by year, because ultimately, we want to
calculate y as a fraction of the threshold, y; and the threshold changes from year to
year.
In the empirical application, we observe that there is a very small hole in the observed
distribution above the threshold, suggesting that many companies are not able to adjust
their turnover due to optimization frictions. To examine the extent of non-response given
frictions, we follow Kleven and Waseem (2013) in rst dening a dominated turnover region
(y; y+yD); where no optimizing rm will locate, whatever the parameter values. Kleven
and Waseem (2013) show that the y solving (11) for any e 2 (0;1) is bounded below by
yD =

1     y
: (20)
So, given the equivalence tN =  , tR =  + , and (20), the dominated region in our case is
yD =
tR   tN
1  tR y
:
In the sample of rms for whom registration is not optimal and are predicted to bunch
below the VAT notch,  is approximately 0.824, and s = 0:548, which gives a value of yD
of 0:08y.
We then estimate the proportion  of companies with large adjustment costs locating in
the strictly dominated region between y and yD relative to the counterfactual density g(y)
as:
 =
R y+4yD
y g(y)d(y)
g(y)
:
Finally, we take account of the fact that some rms who voluntarily register will be in
the dominated region, even if they are fully rational. The corresponding excess bunching
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accounting for optimization frictions is therefore estimated as
bB = bB
1  b :
We interpret estimates of bB as an upper bound of the rmsresponse to the VAT notch,
which represents the amount of bunching had all companies overcome adjustment costs. We
use this adjusted bunching estimate to evaluate the structural elasticity.31
8.2 Bunching Evidence
8.2.1 Baseline Estimates
This section presents evidence of bunching below the VAT notch using the bunching sample
dened in section 6.2. Figure 4 presents bunching around the threshold in each nancial year
between 2004/05 and 2009/10. Panel A shows the empirical distribution of turnover (blue
dots) as a histogram in £ 1,000 bins and the estimated counterfactual distribution (red line)
in 2004-05. Each dot denotes the upper bound of a given bin and represents the number of
companies in each turnover bin of £ 1,000. Similar to Chetty et al. (2011) and Kleven and
Waseem (2013), we estimate the counterfactual distribution by tting a exible polynomial of
order 3 to the empirical distribution, excluding rms in the excluded range close to the VAT
notch. The excluded turnover range is demarcated by the vertical dashed lines and the VAT
notch demarcated by the vertical solid line.32 The next ve panels focus on subsequent years
during which the VAT notch was increased annually to track ination. Each panel shows
estimates of excess bunching below the VAT notch scaled by the counterfactual frequency
at the notch (b) and the share of companies in the dominated range who are unresponsive
() to the VAT notch.
Three main ndings are worth noting in Figure 4. First, the VAT notch creates evident
bunching below the threshold. Excess bunching ranges from 1.82 to 2.82 times the height
of the counterfactual distribution, and is strongly signicant in each year during the sample
period. Second, excess bunching tracks precisely the annual change in the nominal VAT
notch due to adjustment to ination. In each year the excess bunching is concentrated
within £ 2,000 below the VAT. Third, in contrast with the large and sharp bunching below
the threshold, the VAT notch is associated with a small hole in the distribution above the
cuto¤. The range of the hole spans from £ 8,500 to £ 15,000 above the VAT notch and b is
31Standard errors on all estimates are calculated using a residual-based bootstrap procedure as in Chetty
et al. (2011) and Devereux, Liu and Loretz (2014).
32As a robustness check we have tried values between 3 and 5 for the order of the polynomial and out
results are not signicantly changed.
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consistently above 0.8 during the sample period.
To examine whether bunching is primarily driven by xed compliance cost, we separ-
ately examine bunching behavior of growing and shrinking companies. Figure 5 pools all
data over the sample period and presents a histogram of turnover (net of current-year VAT
notch) for growing and shrinking companies in panel A and B, respectively. While there is
bunching below the VAT notch in both panels, it is evident that the excess mass that we
observe in Figure 2 is mainly due to behavioral responses of growing companies in panel
A, with shrinking rms responding in a much smaller extent to the VAT notch in panel B.
These patterns suggest that as small rms grow and approach the threshold, a non-trivial
proportion of them slow down their growth to avoid crossing the threshold for registration,
for which the saving in tax and compliance costs exceeds the reduction in sales volume.
8.2.2 Heterogeneity in Bunching
We have shown a stable distribution of turnover for rms in the predicted sample throughout
the entire period 2004/05-2009/10, with an evident and persistent bunching of companies
below the VAT notch in each year. We now explore potential heterogeneity in bunching to
see whether the empirical pattern is consistent with the predictions set out in Proposition
4, that rms are more likely to bunch below the VAT notch if (1) the share of B2C sales is
high, and (2) the share of input costs is low.
We explore how companies with di¤erent B2C sales ratio respond to the same VAT notch
by dividing companies in each of the predicted bunching and voluntary registration samples
by their medium B2C sales ratio, respectively. We then estimate annual bunching ratios
separately for each subgroup.
Figure 6 plots the point estimate of the bunching ratio with the corresponding 95%
condence intervals in each year and suggests two interesting ndings. First, all the bunching
estimates are positive and highly signicant, even in the lowest B2C quartile where on
average between 0.3% and 25.4% of sales are B2C. Second, there is a clear pattern that the
estimated bunching ratio increases with quartiles of the B2C sales ratio. In particular, the
estimated bunching ratio for rms in the top quartile is signicantly larger than for rms
in the bottom quartile. The observed strong aggregate bunching is mainly driven by the
behavioral responses of companies in the 3rd and 4th quartile of the B2C sales ratio.
To explore how companies with di¤erent shares of direct input cost respond to the same
VAT notch, we construct a rm-specic measure of average input-cost ratio during the
sample period and divide all companies into four groups according to the quartiles of input-
cost ratio. We obtain information on direct cost of sales excluding salary from company
accounts in FAME and since it is optional for small and medium-sized companies to disclose
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this information, only 12.52% of companies in the estimation sample report a non-missing
direct cost of sales. To increase e¢ ciency of the empirical test, we pool observations with non-
missing input cost in all years and present bunching evidence with respect to the normalized
VAT notch in Figure 7.
Panel A compares the empirical distributions of companies around the normalized VAT
notch at four di¤erent quartiles of input-cost ratio. It presents clear evidence that the degree
of bunching decreases with the share of input costs relative to output. The distribution of
companies in the top quartile is quite smooth around the normalized VAT notch, while
distributions of companies in the lower quartiles all exhibit some degree of bunching just
below the VAT notch. Panel B further quanties the di¤erence in the extent of bunching by
plotting the estimated bunching ratio with the corresponding 95% condence interval for each
input-cost ratio quartile. Quantitatively, the bunching estimate is very small and insignicant
for companies in the top quartile of the input-cost ratio distribution. For companies in the
lower quartiles of the distribution, the bunching estimates are positive and highly signicant,
with some suggestive evidence that the largest bunching occurs for companies in the second
and third quartiles of the distribution.
8.2.3 Bunching via Turnover Misreporting
In this section, we provide some suggestive evidence on the extent of bunching due to turnover
misreporting. When bunching is due to a decrease in real output, we expect companies to
reduce their input costs in proportion, so that the distribution of input-cost ratio for non-
registered companies should be smooth around the VAT notch. When bunching is due to
turnover misreporting, we conjecture that the non-registered companies are less likely to
under-report their input costs and wage expenses. Both costs are deductible for corporation
taxes and the latter is subject to third-party reporting. In other words, the gain from under-
reporting the deductible costs is considerably smaller than the gain from under reporting
the turnover to avoid VAT registration. If the majority of companies bunch via turnover
misreporting, we would expect to see a higher average input-cost ratio for the non-registered
group just below the VAT notch, relative to that for the registered group.
Figure 8 pools all observations in the sample period and plots the distribution of av-
erage input-cost ratio for registered and non-registered companies in £ 1,000 turnover bins,
respectively. In Panel A, the input-cost ratio is salary exclusive and represents the share of
direct cost of sales relative to total turnover. The solid blue line shows the average input
cost relative to sales for registered companies within each turnover bin of £ 1,000 normalized
by the current-year VAT notch, and the dashed blue line shows the average input cost ra-
tio for the unregistered companies. Consistent with the theory, voluntary registers incur a
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much larger input cost as indicated by their average input-cost ratio which is consistently
larger than that for the non-registered companies below the VAT notch. On the other hand,
there is no evident increase in the average input-cost ratio just below the VAT notch for the
non-registered group. The distribution is relatively smooth and continues to increase with
turnover above the VAT notch.
In comparison, Panel B plots the distribution of average input-cost ratio inclusive of
salary, for registered and non-registered companies, respectively. There is striking di¤erence
between the two input-cost ratio series just below the VAT notch. The two series move in
parallel directions until the average input-cost ratio for the non-registered companies starts to
increase drastically just below the VAT notch. The sharp increase in the salary-inclusive cost
ratio can be partly attributed to the xed nature of salary cost which takes longer to adjust
than variable costs of input. On the other hand, the sharp increase is also consistent with
the fact that salary is subject to third-party reporting and thus it is more costly/di¢ cult for
small businesses to underreport salary expenses. Overall, Panel A and B in gure 8 provide
suggestive yet not conclusive evidence that part of bunching is due to turnover misreporting.
9 Estimating The Elasticity e
We have seen from section 5 that e is related to the marginal deadweight loss of the VAT
system on producers. It can also tell us something about the elasticity of the VAT base. As
remarked in section 3.2, in our framework, e measures the response of the value-added of the
individual rm to the e¤ective rate of VAT. Another way to see this is via (12) above. In
fact, it is helpful to think of there being two separate tax bases, VN andVR: Then, from (31)
in the Appendix, it is clear that, holding ~a xed, the elasticity of each separate component
of the tax base VN ; VR with respect to the e¤ective rate is equal to e. In particular,
1  tN
VN
@VN
@tN
=  e; 1  tR
VR
@VR
@t
=  e
A caveat is that e is a misestimate of the overall elasticity of the tax base for two reasons.
First, the extensive response via a change in ~a will further erode the tax base when t rises, as
some rms previously registered will choose not to register. This makes e an underestimate
of the elasticity of the tax base. Second, we have assumed a competitive market for the
good with perfectly elastic demand. If demand for the good is less than perfectly elastic, so
an upward shift in the supply curve will increase the equilibrium tax-inclusive price for the
good, thus boosting the tax base. This makes e an overestimate of the elasticity of the tax
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base33. Of course, there is no reason to think that these errors will cancel out.
We will use equation (10) to estimate e. To get a numerical estimate of e; from (10), we
needy=y = b=(1 ); and tR; tN ; which depend on ; s:We set these parameters pooling
observations from all years, following Kleven and Waseem (2013). First, the bunching ratio
y=y is taken from Figure 4; we use the average across all years, adjusted for optimization
frictions. Second, we calculate the e¤ective tax rates tR and tN for companies in the predicted
bunching sample. We obtain the average annual share of sales that are B2C () of 0:824,
and the average input cost to sales ratio (s) of 0:548. Following equation 5, we take the
average of the annual values of tR and tN over the sample period so that tR = 0:266, and
tN = 0:207 for all companies in the predicted bunching sample.
Note that in this exercise, we face two di¢ culties relative to the standard estimation
approach as in Kleven and Waseem (2013) or Best and Kleven (2013). First, tN ; tR are not
given by the tax code, but are constructed from t; s; and : Second, the compliance cost
K is also not given by the tax code, but is calibrated from other studies. In particular,
from the compliance cost study by Federation of Small Businesses (2010), which found the
registration threshold, these costs were around 1.5% of turnover, declining to 0.1% or less
for large companies, we set K=y = 0; 0:01; 0:02. This means that our tax parameters are
subject to measurement error, and so our elasticity estimates should be interpreted with
caution.
Our results are shown in Table 6. The estimated elasticity of the VAT base is around 0.179
assuming no compliance cost. The higher the compliance cost, the lower the elasticity. At a
given K=yof 0:01, we obtain an estimated elasticity of 0.128. The value is further decreased
to 0.091 when the compliance cost increased to K=y = 0:02. Overall, the elasticity values
are considerably smaller than those found by Blundell (2009); as discussed in Section 2, this
may be because the Blundell calculation is for a temporary change, where the elasticity will
of course be higher, due to inter-temporal substitution in consumption.
10 Conclusions
In this paper, we rst developed a conceptual framework for studying VAT voluntary regis-
tration and bunching, designed to be comparable to the framework rst developed by Saez
(2010) to study bunching at tax kinks, while capturing the distinctive features of VAT just
33To see this, consider a very simple market comprised only of households who demand the good, and
suppliers. Households have a product demand p  depending on the tax-inclusive price p; and supply (p=(1+
t))e depends on the tax-exclusive price. Then, assuming no intermediate input, value-added can be written
V =

p
1+t
1+e
: Solving for p from market-clearing, it is easy to compute that V = (1 + t) (1+e)=(e=+1):
So, the elasticity of value-added, (1+ e)=(e=+1); is decreasing in the elasticity of demand for the good, :
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mentioned. This framework predicts that voluntary registration is more likely, and bunching
is less likely, when either (i) the cost of inputs relative to sales is high, or (ii) when the
proportion of B2C sales is low. Finally, we show in our framework that the elasticity of
value-added can be related in a simple way to the deadweight loss of a small increase in the
statutory rate of VAT, thus extending the well-known results of Feldstein (1999) and Chetty
(2009) to an indirect tax setting.
We then brought these predictions to an administrative data-set that is created by linking
the population of corporation and VAT tax records in the UK, and showed that the pattern
of voluntary registration in the data is consistent with the theory. In particular, voluntary
registration is more likely with a low share of B2C sales or a high share of inputs in cost.
Moreover, there is clear evidence of bunching at the VAT threshold. Investigating further, we
saw that, consistently with the theory, there is a clear pattern of heterogeneity in bunching;
the amount of bunching is increasing in the B2C sales ratio, and decreasing in share of ratio
of input costs to sales. .
Finally, we address the issue of the elasticity of value-added with respect to the tax.
Our approach gives an elasticity of 0.09 to 0.179, depending on what is assumed about VAT
registration costs. However, as further explained in Section 9, this estimate is subject to
several biases that work on opposite directions, and should be regarded with some caution.
One interesting issue that we leave for future research is the dynamic behavior of rms
around the VAT notch, and the implications for rm growth. In our data, we see that yearly
bunching below the VAT notch is mainly driven by infrequent bunchers that gradually grow
over time, rather than by a small group of rms that stay below the VAT notch for a prolonged
period of time. Our preliminary analysis on the e¤ect of VAT notch on the growth rate of
small businesses suggest that there is a signicant but rather small e¤ect of the VAT notch
that deters rm growth if turnover is approaching the VAT notch, and that there is a small
and signicant catch-up e¤ect once rms that are previously unregistered cross the threshold.
Investigating this more fully is a topic for future work.
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Figure 1. BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES TO THE VAT NOTCH
Notes: this gure shows the predicted behavioral responses of small rms to the VAT
registration threshold. The red-solid line shows the share of rms that voluntarily
register for VAT, and the green-dashed line shows the share of rms who are bunched
below the VAT notch y. s and  refers to the rm-level input cost ratio and B2C
sales ratio, respectively. tR and tN refers to the e¤ective tax rate when registered
and not registered, respectively, and t is the statutory VAT rate.
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Figure 2. A BINDING VAT NOTCH
A. Share of Registered Companies
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Notes: This gure shows a binding VAT registration threshold in the UK. Panel A shows
the share of VAT-registered companies in the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch
during 2004/05-2009/10. Each observation represents the share of registered companies
relative to the total number of companies within each turnover bin of £ 1,000, net of
current-year VAT threshold. The dashed line indicates the normalized VAT notch. Panel
B shows the histogram of companies within the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch
by pooling data between 2004/05-2009/10. The bin width is £ 1,000 and the dashed line
denotes the normalized VAT notch.
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Figure 3. DISTRIBUTION OF B2C SALES AND INPUT COST RATIO
A. B2C Sales Ratio
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Notes: Panel A compares the empirical distribution of the B2C sales ratio between all the
registered and non-registered companies with a turnover lower than the current-year VAT
notch. The peaks in the density shown in panel A is due to limited variation in the B2C ratio
across rms, as we can only measure the B2C ratios roughly at the 2-digit SIC industry level.
Panel B compares the empirical distribution of the input cost ratio between all the registered
and non-registered companies with turnover between £ 10,000 and £ 200,000. In both panels
the blue-solid line depicts the registered companies and the red-dashed line depicts the non-
registered companies.
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Figure 4. BUNCHING AT VAT NOTCH
A. 2004-05 B. 2005-06
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Notes: this gure shows the observed distribution (solid-dotted line) and the estimated coun-
terfactual distribution (solid-smooth line) of turnover for each year in 2004/05-2009/10. The
counterfactual is a three-order polynomial estimated as in eq. (19). The excluded ranges
around the VAT notch are demarcated by the vertical-dashed lines, and the VAT notch is
demarcated by the vertical solid line. Bunching b is excess mass in the excluded range around
the VAT notch relative to the average counterfactual frequency in this range, and  is the
proportion of companies with large adjustment costs locating in the strictly dominated region.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Figure 5. HETEROGENEITY IN BUNCHING
A. Growing Companies
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Notes: The gure shows the histogram of growing companies within the neighbourhood of nor-
malized VAT notch between 2004/05-2009/10 in the top panel and that of declining companies
in the bottom panel. The bin width is £ 1,000 and the dashed line denotes the normalized
VAT notch.
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Figure 6. BUNCHING ACROSS B2C SALES RATIO QUARTILE
A. 2004-05 B. 2005-06
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Figure 7. BUNCHING ACROSS INPUT-COST RATIO QUARTILE
A. Bunching Evidence
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Notes: The gure shows the observed distribution of turnover across four di¤erent quartiles
of input cost ratio within the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch in 2004/05-2009/10 in
Panel A. Panel B then plots the point estimate of the bunching ratio b and the corresponding
95% condence intervals across the four quartiles of input cost ratio by pooling all the data
in the sample years.
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Figure 8. BUNCHING VIA TURNOVER MISREPORTING
A: Distribution of Direct Input-Cost Ratio
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Notes: The gure plots separately the average input cost ratio for registered and non-registered
rms with a turnover in the neighbourhood of normalized VAT notch during 2004/05-2009/10.
Panel A uses the input cost ratio calculated from FAME and exclude the salary expenses while
Panel uses the input cost ratio calculated from the corporation tax records and includes salary
expenses in the overall cost.
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Table 3. SHARE OF FIRMS THAT VOLUNTARILY REGISTERED FOR VAT (%)
Input Cost Ratio Quartile
B2C Sales Ratio Quartile Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Q1 47.05 47.52 45.99 46.98
Q2 56.35 51.80 52.01 55.43
Q3 24.11 29.01 32.87 36.70
Q4 32.93 34.28 36.04 46.77
Notes: This table shows the share of voluntarily registered rms at di¤erent quartiles of
B2C sales and input cost ratio. The share of voluntarily registered rms is calculated as
the number of rms that are voluntarily registered for VAT relative to the total number of
rms at each given quartile of B2C sales ratio and input cost ratio. Each column depicts
the share of rms that are voluntarily registered for VAT at di¤erent quartiles of B2C
sales ratio at a given input cost ratio quartile. Each row depicts the share of rms that
are voluntarily registered for VAT at di¤erent quartiles of input cost ratio at a given B2C
sales ratio quartile.
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Table 6. ESTIMATED ELASTICITY OF THE VAT BASE
Estimated Elasticitity of the VAT Base
tN tR y
=y K=y
0 0.01 0.02
Bunching Sample 0.207 0.266 0.284 0.179 0.128 0.091
Notes: This table shows estimates of the elasticity of value-added with respect to the VAT
rate at varying value of K=y, the size of compliance cost relative to the VAT notch. tR
and tN are the e¤ective VAT rate under registration and non-registration, respectively,
and y=y measures the percentage turnover response to the notch in the predicted
bunching sample throughout the sample period.
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A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) Let (a) = uR(a)   uN(a); and  (l) = 11+ 1
e
l1+1=e: By the
envelope theorem,
d
da
=
1
a2

0
yR
a

yR   0
yN
a

yN

Next, note that if yR  yN ; this implies tR  tN from (6,7). So, in this case, uR(a)  
uN(a) < 0; if a rm has lower output due to a higher tax, and pays a registration cost, it
must be worse o¤ registering. So, if (a) = uR(a)   uN(a)  0; it must be the case that
yR > yN : But then
d
da
> 0() 0
yR
a

yR > 
0
yN
a

yN () 0
y
a

y increasing in y () 00 > 0
So, we conclude that (a)  0 implies that d
da
> 0: This in turn, plus continuity of (a) in
a; implies that there is exactly one root (~a) = 0; with (a) > 0; a > ~a;(a) < 0; a < ~a: :
Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Assume rst that s= < t
1+t
: It is easily veried that s= <
t
1+t
() tR > tN : Assume now to the contrary that v > 0; from (8), this requires ~a < aR:
Then, there is a rm ~a < a0 < aR that when registered, produces strictly less than yR(a0) <
y; and who would produce more if non-registered. Then, for this rm
uR(a
0) = yR(a0)(1  s)(1  tR)  

yR(a
0)
a0

 K
< yR(a
0)(1  s)(1  tN)  

yR(a
0)
a0

 K
 max
yyR(a0)
n
y(1  s)(1  tN)  
 y
a0
o
 K
 max
yy
n
y(1  s)(1  tN)  
 y
a0
o
= uN(a
0)
So, this rm is better o¤ not registering, a contradiction.
(ii) Now suppose that s= > t
1+t
() tR < tN : Suppose that v  0 i.e. ~a  aR: Then, as
tR < tN ; ~a  aR;
yN(~a) < yR(~a)  yR(aR) = y
So, then, the constraint y  y in the denition of uN(~a) does not bind, and so by straight-
forward computation, we have
uN(~a) = max
y
n
y(1  s)(1  tN)  
y
a
o
=
~a1+e(xN)
1+e
1 + e
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and, in the same way, uR(~a) =
~a1+e(xR)
1+e
1+e
; where xi = (1   s)(1   ti); i = R;N: So, then ~a
is characterized by
~a1+e(xR)
1+e
1 + e
 K   ~a
1+e(xN)
1+e
1 + e
= 0
or, solving:
~a =

K(1 + e)
(xR)1+e   (xN)1+e
1=(1+e)
(21)
Substituting (21) in (8), and using the denition of  in Proposition 2, we get
v = max
8><>:

y
(xR)e
1=(1+e)
 

K(1+e)
(xR)1+e (xN )1+e
1=(1+e)

y
(xR)e
1=(1+e) ; 0
9>=>; (22)
Inspection of (22) reveals that v  0 for   0 = K(1+e)y ; and that v is increasing in ;
as required.
(iii) First consider an increase in : We require @
@
< 0 for the result. But
@
@
=

(1 + e)  e(xR)
1+e   (xN)1+e
(xR)1+e

@xR
@
=  (1 +

xN
xR
1+e
e)
t
1 + t
< 0
as required. Next, consider an increase in s: We need @
@s
> 0 for the result. But
@
@s
=

(1 + e)  e(xR)
1+e   (xN)1+e
(xR)1+e

@xR
@s
  (1 + e)

xN
xR
e
@xN
@s
=  (1 + e

xN
xR
1+e
) + (1 + e)

xN
xR
e
(1 + t)
Now note that @
@s
= (1 + e)t > 0 at xN
xR
= 1; and @
@s
=  1 < 0 at xN
xR
= 0: Moreover,
@2
@s@

xN
xR
 =  e(1 + e)xN
xR
e
+ e(1 + e)

xN
xR
e 1
(1 + t)
> e(1 + e)

xN
xR
e
(
xR
xN
  1) > 0
So, given these two facts, there is a critical value of xN
xR
= 1 tN
1 tR ; say
d1 tN
1 tR above which
@
@s
> 0;
as required. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.
Substituting (6) back in (4), we see that the traders utility at yR(a); not including
compliance costs, is
max
y

y(1  s)(1  tR)  1
1 + 1
e
y
~a
1+1=e
=
~a1+e(xR)
1+e
1 + e
(23)
where xi = (1 s)(1 ti); i = R;N: So, substituting (23) into (9), recalling that ~a = a+a;
we can write the indi¤erence condition as
(a +a)1+e (xR)1+e
1 + e
 K = yxN   1
1 + 1
e

y
a +a
1+1=e
(24)
But note that (a + a); which is unobservable, maps into y + y; which is observable
via y +y = yN(a +a), which gives:
a +a = (y +y)1=(1+e) (xN)
 e=(1+e) (25)
So, using (25) in (24), we get:
(y +y)xR

1
1 + e

 K = yxN   1
1 + 1
e
(y)1+1=e(y +y) 1=exN
or
yxN   1
1 + 1
e
(y)1+1=e(y +y) 1=exN   (y +y)xR

1
1 + e

+K = 0 (26)
After some simplication of (26) i.e. dividing through by y; then by 1+ y

y ; xN ; and using
the denitions of xN ; xR; we get (10), as required: 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) First, (10) can be rewritten as
z = A
 
1
1 + 1=e
z1+1=e+
1
1 + e

xR
xN
1+e!
 f(z);
z =
1
1 + y=y
; A = 1 +K=yxN
Moreover, note that f(:) is strictly increasing and convex, and f(0) > 0. So, z = f(z) has
at most two distinct roots. Also, at the larger root z+, f cuts the 450 line from below, so
f 0(z+) = 1
A
(z+)1=e > 1: As A > 1; this requires, moreover, z+ > 1; which implies y=y < 0
and is thus not an economically relevant solution. So, the smaller root of z = f(z); z ; is
relevant. There is non-negative positive bunching as long as this smaller root is less than or
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equal to 1. This requires f(1)  1 or
1
1 +K=yxN
 
1
1 + 1=e
+
1
1 + e

xR
xN
1+e!
 1
which reduces, after some rearrangement, to
(xR)
1+e   (xN)1+e
(xR)e
 K(1 + e)
y

xN
xR
e
=)   0

xN
xR
e
 1 (27)
There are then two cases. First, if tR  tN ;   0; so (27) certainly holds, proving (i).
Second, if tR < tN ; xN < xR; so 1 < 0; as required for (ii).
(ii) (a) By denition,
xR
xN
=
1  tR
1  tN =
1  s  t=(1 + t)
1  s(1 + t) (28)
By inspection, xR
xN
is decreasing in : So, z  decreases in ; so bunching increases.
(b) First, from (28), we have:
@

xR
xN

@s
=
1
(1  s(1 + t))2

1  s  t
(1 + t)

(1 + t)  1 + s(1 + t)

=
1
(1  s(1 + t))2 t(1  ) > 0
So f is increasing in s via xR
xN
: Moreover, for K small, f ' 1
1+1=e
z1+1=e+ 1
1+e

xR
xN
1+e
and so
it is increasing in s overall. So, z  increases in s; so bunching decreases. 
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) As rms are indi¤erent about registering or not at the cuto¤,
by the envelope theorem,
dU
dt
=  (1  s)@tN
@t
~aZ
0
yN(a)da  (1  s)@tR
@t
amaxZ
~a
yR(a)da (29)
=  @tN
@t
VN   @tR
@t
VR
Moreover, from (12), we have:
dT
dt
=
@tN
@t
VN +
@tR
@t
VR +

tN
@VN
@t
+ tR
@VN
@t

j~a const| {z } +
@T
@~a
@~a
@t| {z }
intensive response extensive response
(30)
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So, combining (29), (30), we get (13).
(ii) Using yi(a) = a1+e(xi)e; i = N;R; we get
VN =
~aZ
0
(1  s)1+e(1  tN)ea1+eda; VR =
amaxZ
~a
(1  s)1+e(1  tR)ea1+eda
and so
@VN
@t
=  e VN
1  tN
@tN
@t
;
@VR
@t
=  e VR
1  tR
@tR
@t
(31)
Substituting (31) into tN @VN@t + tR
@VR
@t
and dividing by @tN
@t
VN +
@tR
@t
VR gives (14).
(iii) Moreover, from the formula for ~a in (21), it is easy to check that
@T
@~a
@~a
@t
= ~a
@T
@~a
(xR)
e 
(1+t)2
  (xN)es
(xR)1+e   (xN)1+e / K
1=(1+e)
as required. 
51
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation 
Working Paper series recent papers 
 
WP 15/05 Clemens Fuest and Li Liu Does ownership affect the impact of taxes on firm 
behaviour? Evidence from China. 
 
WP 15/04 Michael P Devereux, Clemens Fuest and Ben Lockwood The taxation of foreign 
profits: a unified view 
 
WP 15/03 Jitao Tang and Rosanne Altshuler The spillover effects of outward foreign direct 
investment on home countries: evidence from the United States 
 
WP 15/02 Juan Carlos Suarez Serrato and Owen ZidarWho benefits from state corporate 
tax cuts? A local labour markets approach with heterogeneous firms 
 
WP 15/01 Ronald B Davies, Julien Martin, Mathieu Parentis and Farid Taboul Knocking on 
Tax Haven’s Door:Multinational firms and transfer pricing 
 
WP 14/27 Peter Birch Sørensen Taxation and the optimal constraint on corporate debt 
finance 
 
WP 14/26 Johannes Becker, Ronald B Davies and Gitte JakobsThe economics of advanced 
pricing agreements 
 
WP 14/25 Michael P Devereux and John Vella Are we heading towards a corporate tax 
system fit for the 21st century? 
 
WP 14/24 Martin Simmler Do multinational firms invest more? On the impact of internal 
debt financing on capital accumulation 
 
WP 14/23 Ben Lockwood and Erez Yerushalmi Should transactions services be taxed at the 
same rate as consumption? 
 
WP 14/22 Chris Sanchirico As American as Apple Inc: International tax and ownership 
authority 
 
WP 14/19 Jörg Paetzold and Hannes Taking the High Road? Compliance with commuter 
tax allowances and the role of evasion spillovers 
 
WP 14/18 David Gamage How should governments promote distributive justice?: A 
framework for analyzing the optimal choice of tax instruments 
 
WP 14/16 Scott D Dyreng, Jeffrey L Hoopes and Jaron H Wilde Public pressure and 
corporate tax behaviour 
 
WP 14/15 Eric Zwick and James Mahon Do financial frictions amplify fiscal policy? 
Evidence from business investment stimulus 
 
WP 14/14 David Weisbach The use of neutralities in international tax policy 
 
WP 14/13 Rita de la Feria Blueprint for reform of VAT rates in Europe 
 
WP 14/12 Miguel Almunia and David Lopez Rodriguez Heterogeneous responses to 
effective tax enforcement: evidence from Spanish firms 
 
WP 14/11 Charles E McLure, Jack Mintz and George R Zodrow US Supreme Court 
unanimously chooses substance over form in foreign tax credit 
 
WP 14/10 David Neumark and Helen Simpson  Place-based policies 
 
WP 14/09 Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies  A negotiation-based model of tax-
induced transfer pricing 
 
WP 14/08 Marko Koethenbuerger and Michael Stimmelmayr  Taxing multinationals in the 
presence of internal capital markets 
 
WP 14/07 Michael Devereux and Rita de la Feria Designing and implementing a 
destination-based corporate tax 
 
WP 14/05 John W Diamond and George R Zodrow The dynamic economic effects of a US 
corporate income tax rate reduction 
 
WP 14/04 Claudia Keser, Gerrit Kimpel and Andreas Oesterricher The CCCTB option – an 
experimental study 
 
WP 14/03 Arjan Lejour The foreign investment effects of tax treaties 
 
WP 14/02 Ralph-C. Bayer Harald Oberhofer and Hannes Winner The occurrence of tax 
amnesties: theory and evidence 
 
WP14/01 Nils Herger, Steve McCorriston and Christos Kotsogiannisz Multiple taxes and 
alternative forms of FDI: evidence from cross-border acquisitions 
 
WP13/25  Michael Devereux, Niels Johannesen and John Vella Can taxes tame the banks? 
Evidence from European bank levies 
WP13/24  Matt Krzepkowski Debt and  tax losses: the effect of tax asymmetries on the 
cost of capital and capital structure 
WP13/23  Jennifer Blouin, Harry Huizinga, Luc Laeven, Gaëtan Nicodème Thin 
capitalization rules and multinational firm capital structure 
WP13/22  Danny Yagan Capital tax reform and the real economy: the effects of the 2003 
dividend tax cut 
WP13/21  Andreas Haufler and Christoph Lülfesmann  Reforming an asymmetric union: on 
the virtues of dual tier capital taxation 
WP13/20  Michael Blackwell Do the haves come out ahead in tax litigation? An empirical 
study of the dynamics of tax appeals in the UK 
WP13/19  Johannes Becker and Ronald B Davies Learning and international policy diffusion: 
the case of corporate tax policy 
WP13/18  Reuven S Avi-Yonah And yet it moves: taxation and labour mobility in the 21st 
century 
WP13/17 Anne Brockmeyer The investment effect of taxation: evidence from a corporate 
tax kink 
WP13/16 Dominika Langenmayr and Rebecca Lesterz Taxation and corporate risk-taking  
WP13/15 Martin Ruf and Alfons J Weichenrieder CFC legislation, passive assets and the 
impact of the ECJ’s Cadbury-Schweppes decision 
WP13/14 Annette Alstadsæter and Martin Jacob The effect of awareness and incentives 
on tax evasion 
WP13/13 Jarkko Harju and Tuomos Matikka The elasticity of taxable income and income-
shifting between tax bases: what is “real” and what is not? 
WP13/12 Li Liu and Andrew Harper Temporary increase in annual investment allowance 
WP13/11 Alan J Auderbach and Michael P Devererux Consumption and cash-flow taxes in 
an international setting 
WP13/10 Andreas Haufler and Mohammed Mardan Cross-border loss offset can fuel tax 
competition 
WP13/09 Ben Lockwood How should financial intermediation services be taxed? 
WP13/08 Dominika Langenmayr, Andreas Haufler and Christian J bauer Should tax policy 
favour high or low productivity firms? 
WP13/07 Theresa Lohse and Nadine Riedel Do transfer pricing laws limit international 
income shifting? Evidence from European multinationals 
WP13/06 Ruud de Mooij and Jost Heckemeyer Taxation and corporate debt: are banks any 
different? 
WP13/05 Rita de la Feria EU VAT rate structure: towards unilateral convergence? 
WP13/04 Johannes Becker and Melaine Steinhoff Conservative accounting yields excessive 
risk-taking - a note 
WP13/03 Michael P.Devereux, Clemens Fuest, and Ben Lockwood The Taxation of Foreign 
Profits: a Unified View 
WP13/02 Giorgia Maffini  Corporate tax policy under the Labour government 1997-2010 
WP13/01 Christoph Ernst, Katharina Richter and Nadine Riedel  Corporate taxation and the 
quality of research & development 
 
